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Foucault, Neoliberalism, and Equality
Tuomo TiisalaThe charge is familiar by now. Michel Foucault’s uncritical engagement
with neoliberalism, revealed by his posthumously published 1979 lecture
course, shows not only that Foucault is an inept ally for progressive politics
today but also confirms the suspicion that a strategic allegiance lay hidden
between his work and the agenda of neoliberalism.1 As readers of the lec-
tures know, however, the notion of neoliberalism is complicated. Foucault’s
analysis highlights the decisive theoretical and political differences between
American neoliberalism developed by the Chicago School on the one hand
and the German neoliberalism of the Ordoliberals on the other, which re-
spectively constitute two distinct paths of “programming anew the liberal
rationality of governing [la gouvernementalité libérale]” in the twentieth cen-
tury.2 The latter, which continues to define the policy playbook of the Euro-
pean Union, for instance, embeds the economic market in a framework of
political institutions, including a commitment to substantial welfare poli-
cies, all understood as necessary social preconditions for a well-functioning
market. What the critics of Foucault have in mind, of course, is American
neoliberalism, which, in contrast, defines rational agency in terms of marketI am grateful to Bernard Harcourt, Thimo Heisenberg, Magdalena Małecka, Jake McNulty,
Timo Miettinen, and Richard Neer for comments on drafts of this article. I also wish to thank
the audiences who attended my talks on this topic at Copenhagen Business School, The New
School for Social Research, and the University of Helsinki, as well as the organizers of these
events, especially Morten Sørensen Thaning and Daniel Rodriguez-Navas. Unless otherwise noted,
all translations are my own.
1. For the provocative tone behind the controversy, see Daniel Zamora, “Introduction:
Foucault, the Left, and the 1980s,” in Foucault and Neoliberalism, ed. Zamora and Michael C.
Behrent (Malden, Mass., 2015), pp. 10–13.
2. Michel Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitique: Cours au Collège de France 1978–1979 (Paris,
2004), p. 95; hereafter abbreviated N.
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24 Tuomo Tiisala / Foucault, Neoliberalism, and Equalityrelations and seeks to transform, theoretically and politically, all social rela-
tions into market relations. Therefore, my focus, too, will be on this more
radical type of neoliberalism. Already in 1979 Foucault registers its “differ-
ently rigorous or differently complete and exhaustive radicality,” before
Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher channeled neoliberalism politically
as the rationality that came to dominate governing through the next decades
till our present (N, p. 248).3 Concurrently with this ascendance of neoliber-
alism, economic inequality in the US has regressed to the extravagant levels
of the 1920s. Yet it should not be surprising, so the charge goes, if Foucault’s
work appears sterile in the face of these developments. Foucault’s lectures on
American neoliberalism reveal that this critical impotence is no accident.
For in his analysis of the work of Gary Becker, a key figure of the Chicago
School, Foucault welcomes and endorses the neoliberal rationality.4 No
doubt, many of Foucault’s followers are struggling in denial or trying to re-
orient themselves because we now know that the erstwhile critic par excel-
lence in fact ushered in the world of injustice true progressives need to de-
nounce today.
While I, like most readers of Foucault, do not endorse this narrative, I
believe the ongoing controversy merits close attention for several reasons.
Foucault’s sympathizers have typically failed to admit that he does in fact3. Following Foucault, I am using the term governing in the broad sense of a conduction of
conduct. Autonomy, too, is a species of governing, namely self-governing, but I will discuss gov-
erning in this article only from the perspective of rationalities through which some conduct
the conduct of others. Thus understood, a rationality of governing is a practice of thinking that
defines why and how some undertake to conduct the conduct of others. See Foucault, “The
Subject and Power,” in Power, vol. 3 of Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1988, trans. Robert
Hurley, ed. James D. Faubion (New York, 2001); hereafter abbreviated “S.” (This text was origi-
nally published, and probably also written, in English.) For the related notion of rationality, see
Foucault, “Table ronde du 20 mai 1978,” in Dits et écrits, 1976–1988, ed. Daniel Defert, François
Ewald, and Jacques Lagrange, 2 vols. (Paris, 2001), 2:844–49.
4. In his 1979 lecture course, Foucault cites three texts by Becker: see Gary Becker, “Invest-
ment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis,” Journal of Political Economy 70 (Oct. 1962):
9–49, “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,” Journal of Political Economy 76
(Mar.–Apr. 1968): 196–217, and The Economic Approach to Human Behavior (Chicago, 1976). I
do not try to assess how accurately Foucault interprets Becker’s views. For Becker’s generally
favorable commentary on Foucault’s interpretation of his work, see Becker, Ewald, and Bernard
Harcourt, “Becker on Ewald on Foucault on Becker: American Neoliberalism and Michel
Foucault’s 1979 ‘Birth of Biopolitics’ Lectures,” The Carceral Notebooks 7 (2011): 1–35 and “Becker
and Foucault on Crime and Punishment,” The Carceral Notebooks 9 (2013): 5–45. These are tran-
scriptions of two public conversations between Harcourt, Becker, and Ewald at the University of
Chicago on 9 May 2012 and 15 May 2013, respectively.
Tuomo Tiisala is a university lecturer in practical philosophy at the University
of Helsinki.
Critical Inquiry / Autumn 2021 25welcome and even endorse aspects of Becker’s neoliberal theory.5 There-
fore, a successful interpretation of Foucault’s relationship with neoliberal-
ism needs to acknowledge this salutary response and explain it in terms
that disentangle Foucault’s motives from a blanket ascription of neoliberal
commitments. My first goal in this article is to offer such a nuanced read-
ing. The key is to link Foucault’s discussion of Becker with the main argu-
ment of Discipline and Punish, where Foucault shows how the rationality
of penal practices was transformed and geared towards a new goal of nor-
malization during the first half of the nineteenth century. But Becker’s ac-
count of crime and punishment, an application of his neoliberal theory of
rational agency to a specific domain of action, reconfigures penal rational-
ity in terms that undermine the project of normalization. Given Foucault’s
aim to overcome the apparatus of normalization, this feature of Becker’s
work indeedmerits a sympathetic response. But we will see that it can be sep-
arated, as Foucault does, from any broader endorsement of Becker’s neolib-
eral economic theory or its political implications.
However, I do believe that there is a strategic allegiance between Fou-
cault’s work and today’s neoliberal governmental rationality, even though
the connection has nothing to do with Foucault’s 1979 lectures. My second
goal is to explain this strategic link in terms of an analytic of power that em-
ploys Foucault’s methodological ideas to study the power effects his own
work has created in the posthumous context marked by the ascendance of
neoliberalism. By thus analyzing Foucault’s work “on the level of its exis-
tence,” as a discursive practice that is causally linked to other social practices
in a particular historical context, it becomes possible to explain its strategic
allegiance with neoliberal governmental rationality, while denying any logi-
cal or conceptual link between the two.6 I will argue that Foucault’s remark-
able success in drawing attention to the political stakes of subjectivity has
posthumously come to reinforce the neoliberal exclusion of economic equal-
ity as a topic of political discourse. To specify the nature of this link I will in-
troduce the concept of topical exclusion. It enables one to incorporate the so-
cial production of ignorance into an analytic of power but, crucially, without
harking back to the notion of false consciousness. Topical exclusion takes
place on the level of attention. A topic of general interest such as economic
equality may become marginalized, even excluded, from political discourse5. See Becker, Ewald, and Harcourt, “Becker on Ewald on Foucault on Becker” and “Becker
and Foucault on Crime and Punishment.”
6. Foucault, “Foucault explique son dernier livre,” in Dits et écrits, 1:806. See also Foucault,
“Réponse à une question,” in Dits et écrits, 1:708 and “La philosophie analytique de la politique,”
in Dits et écrits, 1976–1988, 2:540.
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standing of what politics is about, has shifted elsewhere—for instance, from
economic equality to questions of identity. Whereas the neoliberal govern-
mental rationality conceptually eliminates economic equality as a topic of
justice, Foucault’s work has posthumously come to function as an unwitting
ally that reinforces this topical exclusion. This, I will argue, is a central yet
unintended effect of Foucault’s success in drawing attention to the political
stakes of subjectivity.
In the end, by introducing the concept of topical exclusion, my aim is to
make a contribution whose importance extends beyond the controversy at
hand. The strategic link I identify between Foucault’s work and neoliber-
alism underscores the urgent need to theorize how the management of at-
tention functions in tactics and strategies of power today. This is an essen-
tial task for any adequate analysis of how power is exercised in a world of
digital platforms that nudge us with endless algorithmic resources.7 Yet the
phenomenon of topical exclusion risks being theoretically occluded by the
power/knowledge interface Foucault was so keen to study. InHistory of Sex-
uality, for instance, Foucault undertakes to explain the emergence of sexu-
ality as a field of scientific study in terms of “the strategies of power that are
immanent to this will to know” and identifies, to that end, “four main strat-
egies deployed in the nineteenth century: sexualization of the child, hys-
terization of the woman, specification of the perverts, regulation of popula-
tions.”8 In Foucault’s analysis, these strategies of power support the will to
seek knowledge about sexuality and rely on the resultant discursive practice
in their own expansion. Indeed, Foucault underscores, it is a question of
power that cannot be exercised without a sustained will to know, which
manifests as a continuous production of truth-claims about its objects.97. For some of the most illuminating work on this new constellation of power, see Tamsin
Shaw, “Invisible Manipulators of Your Mind,” review of The Undoing Project: A Friendship
That Changed Our Minds by Michael Lewis, The New York Review of Books, 20 Apr. 2017, www
.nybooks.com/articles/2017/04/20/kahneman-tversky-invisible-mind-manipulators; Shoshana
Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Humane Future at the New Frontier
of Power (New York, 2019); and Colin Koopman, How We Became Our Data: A Genealogy of
the Informational Person (Chicago, 2019).
8. Foucault, La volonté de savoir, vol. 1 of Histoire de la sexualité (Paris, 1976), pp. 98, 150.
9. See Foucault, “Il faut défendre la société”: Cours au Collège de France 1975–1976 (Paris,
1997), p. 22. With the benefit of hindsight, Foucault came to distinguish three levels of organi-
zation for relations of power, understood as actions on the actions of others: (1) relations of
force between individuals, (2) governmental rationalities, and (3) states of domination. I be-
lieve that the claim that power cannot be exercised without reliance on a discursive practice of
truth-claims should be restricted to the level of governmental rationality, which is where Fou-
cault locates the power/knowledge interface. See Foucault, “L’éthique du souci de soi comme
pratique de la liberté,” in Dits et écrits, 2:1547.
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a conceptual supplement that enables one to explain how, in other cases, tac-
tics and strategies of power harness and produce ignorance instead. The con-
cept brings into relief the need for a political economy of attention in the
analysis of how power is exercised.
1. Foucault’s Genealogy of Modern Governmental Rationality
Foucault’s surprising engagement with neoliberalism needs to be con-
textualized in his genealogy ofmodern governmental rationality.While Fou-
cault’s analyses range from the emergence of pastoral power in early Chris-
tianity through nineteenth-century forensic psychiatry to French court cases
in the 1970s, they are unified by the aim to explain how governmental ratio-
nality became organized around the goal of normalization. This explanatory
task is subservient to Foucault’s ultimate aim to enable, even catalyze, a
transformation of the given governmental rationality. The historical work
aims to promote autonomy in the present by making the rationality of nor-
malization intelligible as a contingent configuration that can be resisted and
overcome. Thus, by explaining how the rationality of governing became or-
ganized in terms of normalization, Foucault seeks to destabilize the given appa-
ratus of normalization that spans the fields of penality, sexuality, and beyond.10
Understanding how the apparatus of normalization took shape in history is
meant to empower people in the present to create a world without it.11
This focus on normalization is motivated by Foucault’s overarching proj-
ect to investigate “the relations between the subject and truth.”12 In 1978, a
year before the lectures on neoliberalism, Foucault notes that an analytic of
power, specifically an analysis of governmental rationality, is needed to un-
derstand the relationship between truth and subjectivity: “my problem is to
know how people govern (themselves and others) through the production
of truth (I repeat it again, by the production of truth I don’t mean the pro-
duction of true statements but the configuration of fields where the practice10. See Foucault, “Entretien de Michel Foucault avec André Berten, 7 mai 1981,” in Mal
faire, dire vrai: Fonction de l’aveu en justice. Cours de Louvain, 1981, ed. Fabienne Brion and
Harcourt (Louvain-la-Neuve, 2012), pp. 242–43. See also Foucault, “Est-il donc important de
penser?” in Dits et écrits, 2:999–1000 and “Structuralisme et poststructuralisme,” in Dits et écrits,
2:1267–68, and Friedrich Nietzsche, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” in
Untimely Meditations, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, ed. Daniel Breazeale (Cambridge, Mass., 1997),
pp. 75–77.
11. For a discussion of genealogy’s explanatory role in the promotion of freedom, see
Michael Forster, “Genealogy,” American Dialectic 1, no. 2 (2011): 230–50, and Colin Koopman,
Genealogy as Critique: Foucault and the Problems of Modernity (Bloomington, Ind., 2013). See
also John Richardson, Nietzsche’s Values (New York, 2020), pp. 322–27.
12. Foucault, “L’éthique du souci de soi comme pratique de la liberté,” p. 1536.
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relevant).”13 The link between the subject and truth is not merely epistemic,
but, by the same token, it constitutes individuals as subjects to be governed
according to some specific rationality. For example, the constitution of the
delinquent and the pervert as objects of nineteenth-century human sciences
is inseparable from the emergence of the new rationality of governing people
with the goal of normalization. Not only does it apply to those who have
been classified as different kinds of abnormal individuals but also to those,
in effect everyone, who might be abnormal.14 This rationality of governing
makes every individual obligated to seek the truth about one’s normality
and to correct potential deviations from the norm. Thus, the link between
the subject and truth is embedded in a particular governmental rationality
in which it plays the pivotal role of defining who is to be governed, by whom,
how, and why. For instance, Foucault shows how sexual conduct was incor-
porated into the apparatus of normalization once people, the entire popula-
tion of individuals, became constituted as objects of a psychiatric discourse
of sexuality.15
A governmental rationality always rests on some set of truth-claims, but
a key event in Foucault’s genealogy occurs when the source of these truth-
claims becomes located in the discursive practices of human sciences. In
this shift, a new basis for rationalizing governing takes shape, one that is in-
dependent of legal, moral, and religious authority precisely because it con-
sists of scientific truth-claims about the normal and the pathological: “We
have entered into a type of society where the power of law is not decreasing
but being integrated with a power that is muchmore general, broadly speak-
ing, the power of the norm.”16 Nor is it just any social norms but specifically
standards of normality articulated by human sciences that establish a new
basis for governmental rationality: “The preponderance conferred onto pa-
thology becomes a general form of governing society [une form générale de
régulation de la société]. Today medicine no longer has a field outside of it-
self.”17 Finding its basis in the discursive practices of human sciences, the ra-
tionality of normalization emerges, expands, and begins to function as an
apparatus that brings together previously distinct social practices: “Medical13. Foucault, “Table ronde du 20 mai 1978,” p. 846.
14. Studying the conceptual preconditions for introducing normalization to the field of
sexuality, Arnold Davidson sums up how the concept of sexual perversion affects everyone,
thus: “our existence became a sexistence, saturated with the promises and threats of sexuality”
(Arnold I. Davidson, The Emergence of Sexuality: Historical Epistemology and the Formation of
Concepts [Cambridge, Mass., 2001], p. xiii).
15. See Foucault, La volonté de savoir. See also Davidson, The Emergence of Sexuality.
16. Foucault, “L’extension sociale de la norme,” in Dits et écrits, 2:75.
17. Foucault, “Crise de la médecine ou crise de l’antimédecine?” in Dits et écrits, 2:53.
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medicine’s power appear everywhere: be it in the family, at school, in the
factory, in the courts, concerning sexuality, education, work, crime. Medi-
cine has become a general social function: it invests the law, attaches to it,
makes it function.”18 Foucault’s genealogical aim is to reveal that this gov-
ernmental rationality that is normalizing—and appears to be necessarily
so—is, in fact, a “transformable singularity,” specifically an apparatus whose
rationality has coalesced in history and whose different functions can be de-
coupled and redefined.19 For instance, Foucault’sHistory of Sexuality seeks to
enable new forms of subjectivity through which sexual conduct is consti-
tuted as an object of self-governing from an ethical perspective, in contrast
to the received rationality of governing sexual conduct on the basis of psy-
chiatric truth-claims regarding the normal and the pathological.20
No doubt, these are familiar ideas that have been discussed extensively,
but I need to invoke them nevertheless as essential background for under-
standing Foucault’s engagement with Becker’s neoliberalism. In this respect,
it is particularly important to grasp why Foucault focuses on subjectivity,
making his critical project “a historical ontology of ourselves.”21 Foucault’s
line of work, as I have summarized it, is meant to reinforce ongoing “struggles
against the ‘government of individualization’” in the fields of mental health,
penality, and sexuality, all functioning as parts of the apparatus of normali-
zation (“S,” p. 330). Foucault explains that “the main objective of these strug-
gles is to attack not so much such-or-such institution of power, or group, or
elite, or class but, rather, a technique, a form of power . . . that categorizes the
individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own
identity, imposes a law of truth on him that he must recognize and others
have to recognize in him” (“S,” p. 331). If subjectivity plays a crucial role in18. Foucault, “L’extension sociale de la norme,” p. 76.
19. Foucault, “Préface à l’Histoire de la sexualité,” in Dits et écrits, 2:1399.
20. Foucault’s History of Sexuality aims to destabilize and overcome two interconnected tar-
gets at two distinct levels. The most immediate target is the given governmental rationality that
defines sexuality in terms of the normal and the pathological, based on truth-claims of a sci-
entific discourse. This governmental rationality relies on a regime of truth, in which every
individual has an obligation to seek the truth about oneself through an interpretation of one’s
sexual desire. As Foucault’s genealogy reveals, this obligation extends back to early Christianity,
whereas its coalescence with normalization is a distinctively modern development. Ultimately,
Foucault’s target is that underlying obligation to constitute oneself as a subject through an in-
terpretation of one’s sexual desire. See Davidson, “La fin de l’herméneutique de soi,” in Michel
Foucault: éthique et vérité, ed. Ariane Revel, Daniele Lorenzini, and Arianna Sforzini (Paris,
2013), pp. 67–76. For a discussion of Foucault’s alternative vision, see David Halperin, “The
Queer Politics of Michel Foucault,” Saint Foucault: Towards a Gay Hagiography (New York,
1995), pp. 15–125.
21. Foucault, “Qu’est-ce que les Lumières?” in Dits et écrits, 2:1393; hereafter abbreviated “Q.”
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governmental rationality relies on a specific understanding of individuals
in terms of the normal and the pathological. Therefore, Foucault emphasizes
that this governmental rationality can be permanently disrupted only by un-
doing the form of subjectivity that makes it function.22 That is why Foucault
urges, highlighting the political dimension of “a historical ontology of our-
selves,” that people repudiate the identities that descend from the apparatus
of normalization (“Q,” p. 1393):
Maybe the most certain of all philosophical problems is the problem
of the present time, and of what we are, in this very moment.
Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are but to re-
fuse what we are. We have to imagine and build up what we could be
to get rid of this kind of political ‘double bind,’ which is the simul-
taneous individualization and totalization of modern power structures.
The conclusion would be that the political, ethical, social, philo-
sophical problem of our days is not to try to liberate the individual
from the state, and from the state’s institutions, but to liberate us both
from the state and from the type of individualization linked to the state.
We have to promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of
this kind of individuality that has been imposed on us for several cen-
turies. [“S,” p. 336; my emphasis]
From the perspective of Foucault’s concern with normalization, then, Beck-
er’s work obtains its significance as signaling a departure from the govern-
mental rationality that aims at normalization. As we will see, the conceptual
structure of Becker’s theory of homo economicus does away with individual-
ization that subjects individuals to the apparatus of normalization. There-
fore, from Foucault’s critical perspective towards normalization, Becker’s
theory constitutes not merely a conceptual alternative but a political im-
provement. This does not mean that a governmental rationality based on
Becker’s theory of homo economicus could not give rise to new problems
that are no less severe than normalization yet decidedly different. Before ex-
plaining how Becker’s theory articulates a governmental rationality without
individualization, however, let me contextualize Foucault’s discussions of
liberalism and neoliberalism in the context of the genealogy whose contours
I have sketched.22. For Foucault’s explicit refusal of the idea that one defines one’s identity in terms of sex-
uality, see Foucault, “Entretien de Michel Foucault avec Jean François et John De Wit, 22 mai
1981,” in Mal faire, dire vrai, p. 254. Foucault’s related notion of totalization also merits a de-
tailed discussion, but I have to postpone it for another occasion.
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Foucault begins his 1979 course, The Birth of Biopolitics, by arguing that
the apparatus of normalization is genealogically dependent on the political
success of laissez-faire liberalism in the second half of the eighteenth cen-
tury. The liberal economists forged the link that grounds governmental ra-
tionality in scientific truth-claims when they succeeded in persuading the
state to abstain from market intervention by arguing that the market is
naturally set to produce an optimal outcome. Foucault does not attribute
epistemic success to this idea, but he studies its political adoption as a his-
torical event. His genealogical argument is that, once the link is established
between governmental rationality and truth-claims that carry scientific au-
thority, this link defines a new, decidedly modern way to organize the ra-
tionality of governing. Political and legal discourses become subordinated
to scientific discourse as the ultimate source of justification and conceptu-
alization. Because this configuration also underlies the apparatus of normal-
ization as we have seen already, it functions as an enabling condition for the
birth of biopolitics.
However, it is rather misleading from Foucault to claim that in this shift
governmental rationality becomes dependent on “the question of truth”
(N, p. 24). In his previous lecture course, Foucault had analyzed how the
source of the truth-claims that function as the basis of governmental ratio-
nality changes from the theology of the Christian pastorate to raison d’état
that emerges in the eve of modernity.23 What changes is the source of the
truth-claims, the type of authority they carry, as well as the socially differen-
tiated obligations to produce truth-claims that enable governing. But it re-
mains constant throughout this long history that the rationality of governing
is based on some discursive practice of truth-claims. In fact, the transforma-
tions Foucault traces pertain to the regime of truth, a system of social practices
that assigns to individuals permissions and obligations to produce truth-
claims that are needed for the given governmental rationality.24 Therefore,
it is not “the question of truth” as such, but specifically the scientific authority
of truth-claims, which liberalism introduces as the new basis for organizing
the rationality of governing. To appreciate this, it is instructive to ask what
exactly Foucault means by “a certain type of discourse,” when he describes
the key moment liberalism brings about, as follows:23. See Foucault, Sécurité, térritoire, population: Cours au Collège de France 1977–1978 (Paris,
2004).
24. See Foucault, “Entretien avec Michel Foucault,” in Dits et écrits, 2:158–59. It would be
illuminating to consider Foucault’s notion regime of truth as an elaboration of his earlier dis-
cussion of enunciative modalities. See Foucault, L’archéologie du savoir (Paris, 1969), pp. 68–74.
See also Lorenzini, La force du vrai: De Foucault à Austin (Lormont, 2017), pp. 41–78.
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the reign of the true in politics, but a certain regime of truth that char-
acterizes precisely what could be called the age of politics and whose
basic apparatus is overall the same still today. When I say regime of
truth, I don’t mean that politics or the art of governing, if you wish,
finally obtains rationality in that epoch. I don’t mean that an episte-
mological threshold is reached such that the art of governing could be-
come scientific on its basis at that moment. What I mean is that at
that moment, which I’m currently trying to indicate, a certain type
of discourse is articulated to a series of practices—a discourse which,
on the one hand, makes the ensemble connected through a link of in-
telligibility and, on the other, legislates these practices in terms of the
true and the false. [N, p. 20; my emphasis]
Here the “type of discourse” is not merely a discourse of truth-claims but
such a discourse with a scientific status. This is confirmed by the continuity
Foucault quickly notes between the case of liberalism and his other studies:
“The goal of all these undertakings with respect to madness, illness, delin-
quency, sexuality, and what I now talk to you about [liberalism], is to show
how the coupling series of practices—regime of truth forms an apparatus of
knowledge-power” (N, p. 22; my emphasis). What all these cases have in
common is the use of the authority of scientific truth-claims as the basis
for organizing the rationality of governing.
After this argument, however, Foucault shifts focus to the twentieth cen-
tury with the aim of studying how the governmental rationality of laissez-
faire liberalism has been reconfigured in German and American neoliberal-
ism, respectively. As I have already indicated, the result is a sharp bifurcation
between two types of neoliberal governmental rationality. Foucault’s “Ger-
man neoliberalism” emerges between 1930 and 1950 among a group ofGerman
economists who reject the classical view of the market as a system of ex-
change with a natural equilibrium. They redefine the market as a social in-
stitution, always constituted and regulated by a broader institutional frame-
work, whose role is to create and sustain conditions that approximate the
ideal of perfect competition. Importantly, this type of neoliberalism under-
stands publicly funded welfare policies and the regulation of markets as two
indispensable components of a sound social organization of economic com-
petition. Neoliberalism, thus understood, has been central to the govern-
mental rationality of the European Union since the beginning to this day.
In contrast, Foucault’s “American neoliberalism,” developed by economists
at the University of Chicago from the late 1950s onwards, offers a theory of
all social relations as market relations. Its radical divergence from German
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is, in fact, indeed a question of always generalizing the economic form of
the market. It is a question of generalizing it all the way to the entire social
system that, ordinarily, does not function or is not sanctioned by monetary
exchanges” (N, p. 248). Herein, Foucault stresses, lies “the differently rigor-
ous or differently complete and exhaustive radicality” of American neoliber-
alism vis-à-vis its German counterpart.
Becker’s theory of human capital plays a crucial role in making an un-
constrained expansion of the market even theoretically palatable. Becker’s
theory reconceptualizes all social relations, indeed rational action as such,
in terms of investment and profit. It thereby profoundly modifies the re-
ceived conception of rational agency as efficient satisfaction of ranked
preferences. In Becker’s theory, actions of rational agents are conceptual-
ized as investment decisions that seek profit by means of allocating scarce
resources. What matters is the yield, a profit or a loss, that one obtains for the
human capital that one invests through action. Every action is an investment
decision to expend one’s human capital, to allocate resources such as time
and skills that can generate a profit. Today we are all familiar with the re-
sultant neoliberal entrepreneurial subject whose posts and likes, as well as
the entire digitized social network, function as techniques, assets, and op-
portunities for generating revenue by developing oneself, according to the
logic of invested capital.25 In 1979, with no glimpse of the internet, social
media, and algorithmic advertising in sight, Foucault nonetheless registers
this core rationality of American neoliberalism, though in unavoidably ab-
stract terms, thus:
The homo economicus is an entrepreneur and an entrepreneur of it-
self. And this is so true that what is at stake, in practice, in all the
analyses the neoliberals make, is substituting every time for the homo
economicus who is a partner of exchange, a homo economicus that is
an entrepreneur of itself, being its own capital, being for itself its
own producer, being for itself the source of [its] income. [N, p. 232]
This brief summary of the bifurcation of neoliberalism suffices to make
it clear that it is specifically American neoliberalism whose governmental
rationality poses a threat to a well-functioning democratic society, as Wendy
Brown argues, because it only recognizes economic reasons and thereby aims
to eliminate moral and political perspectives altogether from the rationality25. See Harcourt, Exposed: Desire and Disobedience in the Digital Age (Cambridge, Mass.,
2015).
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inforce the charge that Foucault ought to have denounced Becker’s ideas and
that because he didn’t we can rightly hold him accountable for neoliberal-
ism’s subsequent theoretical and political victories. There is no doubt that
a historical ontology of ourselves, today, requires a genealogy of the neolib-
eral entrepreneurial subject. But while its rationality permeates our social
relations today, in 1979 it must have appeared to Foucault as an abstract, even
somewhat fantastical, theoretical construction with no real effects. In fact, the
urgency of a critical outlook that is grounded in our own present risks oc-
cluding the radically different perspective from which Foucault encounters
and evaluates Becker’s work. I have already identified the apparatus of nor-
malization as Foucault’s guiding concern, so let me next explain how it in-
forms Foucault’s sympathetic response to Becker’s account of crime and
punishment. Because the crucial issue concerns the governmental rationality
of penal practices, Foucault’s engagement with Becker must be read against
the backdrop of the main argument in Discipline and Punish.
3. Penal Rationality: With and Without Normalization
If the guiding concern throughout Foucault’s genealogy of modern gov-
ernmental rationality is how governing became normalization, Discipline
and Punish examines that question specifically with respect to the rational-
ity of penal practices.27 The topic of the book, often overshadowed by the
iconic analyses of disciplinary power and the Panopticon, is the formation
of a new governmental rationality in the field of penality that is founded
on criminological truth-claims about the delinquent as a new object of
study. Foucault states this clearly at the outset: “The goal of this book: a
correlative history of the modern soul and of a new power to judge; a ge-
nealogy of the current scientific-legal complex where the power to judge
finds its points of support, receives its justifications and rules, extends its
effects, and masks its exorbitant singularity.”28 In other words, Foucault
undertakes to explain how the legal practice of punishing became organized26. See Wendy Brown, Undoing Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution (Brooklyn, N.Y.,
2015).
27. Thus, it is instructive to read Discipline and Punish as an actual case study of Nietzsche’s
rather speculative remarks about how “people think punishment has evolved for the purpose
of punishing,” but “today it is impossible to say precisely why people are actually punished” be-
cause the practice of punishing has served multiple functions in different historical contexts
(Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, trans. Carol Diethe, ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson [New
York, 2007], pp. 51, 53).
28. Foucault, Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison (Paris, 1975), p. 27; hereafter abbrevi-
ated S.
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Foucault seeks to “understand at the same time how the man, the soul, the
individual that is normal or abnormal, have come to double the crime as
objects of penal intervention, and in what way a specific mode of subjection
could give birth to man as an object of knowledge for a discourse with a
‘scientific’ status” (S, pp. 28–29). At the heart of this apparatus of knowl-
edge and power we find the delinquent as the new object to be explained
and, crucially, normalized:
From the hearing till the sentence and the last stages of the punish-
ment, the penal ritual is thoroughly permeated by a field of objects that
come to double, but also to detach the legally defined objects. Psychi-
atric expertise, but in a more general manner criminal anthropology
and the incipient discourse of criminology find there one of their pre-
cise functions: in ceremoniously inscribing infractions into the field of
objects susceptible to scientific knowledge, giving the mechanisms of
legal punishment a justifiable grip no longer merely on the infractions
but on the individuals; no longer on what they have done, but on what
they are, will be, and can be. [S, pp. 23–24]
This epistemological “doubling”—of the crime by the delinquent, and of the
sexual act by the pervert—gives rise to a governmental rationality that targets
individuals and aims at their normalization, instead of merely sanctioning
forbidden actions. And it is this feature, perhaps so familiar to us that it
seems obvious, whose “exorbitant singularity” Foucault’s genealogy aims
to disclose in order to reinforce the struggle for its dissolution (S, p. 27).
Therefore, it is crucially important that Becker’s theory of crime and pun-
ishment avoids the pivotal mechanism that subjects people to the apparatus
of normalization by means of a “political ‘double-bind,’ which is the simul-
taneous individualization and totalization of modern power structures”
(“S,” p. 336). Becker’s approach denies that crime is a manifestation of de-
linquent personality or of any other psychological characteristic that could
be profiled and assessed in terms of the normal and the pathological. By
reconceptualizing crime in terms of economic rationality, indeed as an in-
vestment that carries a certain level of risk, Becker redefines it as behavior
of self-interested agents that respond rationally to the incentive structure of
their environment. Foucault underscores the thoroughgoing consequences
of this shift, as follows:
This also means that, in this perspective, the criminal is in no way
characterized or investigated in terms of moral or anthropological
properties. The criminal is nothing other than absolutely anyone. The
36 Tuomo Tiisala / Foucault, Neoliberalism, and Equalitycriminal is everyone and thus not treated but as any other person who
invests in an action, who expects a profit from it, and who accepts the
risk of a loss. From that point of view, the criminal is nothing other
and must remain nothing other than that. To that extent, you see that
what the penal system is to deal with is no longer this doubled reality of
the crime and the criminal. It is conduct, a series of conduct that pro-
duces actions. These actions, whose agents expect a profit, are affected
by a special risk that is not simply the one of economic loss, but the pe-
nal risk or furthermore a risk of this economic loss that is inflicted by
a penal system. The penal system itself will not be dealing with criminals,
but with people who produce that type of action. To put it differently, it
will be reacting to a supply of crime. [N, p. 265; my emphasis]
According to Becker, our rational nature as self-interested economic agents
makes us all potential criminals and the political question is how much de-
mand society should create for crime by the incentive structure of its penal
code. Thus, Becker’s theory redefines crime as just another instance of the
general matrix of economic rationality that makes human action govern-
able by incentives. In doing so, Becker’s theory redefines the basis of govern-
mental rationality in terms that disable the project of normalization. There-
fore, one should not be surprised that Foucault welcomes this shift as an
improvement that sketches the contours of a new governmental rationality
that will be severed for good from the apparatus of normalization:
It is no longer a society in which the general mechanism of normaliza-
tion and of the exclusion of the non-normalizable would be required.
On the contrary, on the horizon of this, one has the image, the idea, or
the platform, of a society in which there would be an optimization of
systems of difference, in which there would be tolerance attributed to
minority individuals and practices, in which there would be action not
on the players of the game but on the rules of the game, and finally in
which there would be an intervention that would not be of the type
that involves subjection internal to individuals, but a type of intervention
that pertains to their environment [il y aurait une intervention qui ne
serait pas du type de l’assujetissement interne des individus, mais une in-
tervention de type environnemental]. [N, p. 265; my emphasis]
The crux of the matter is that this shift amounts to “a massive with-
drawal in relation to the normalizing-disciplinary system [système normatif-
disciplinaire],” whose governmental rationality is based on the individualizing
truth-claims of human sciences that make the personality of the individual,
under this or that description, the target of control and modification (N,
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need to be normalized, whereas the category of the incorrigible, and thus
“non-normalizable,” captures the “dangerous individual” who needs to be
excluded in the interest of social security.29 In both cases, the rationality
of governing is “internal to individuals” in the sense that it constitutes their
subjectivity as a species of the genus abnormal. “This form of power applies
itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes the individual,marks him
by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of
truth on him that he must recognize and others have to recognize in him”
(“S,” p. 331; my emphasis). In Becker’s theory, in contrast, Foucault sees an
example of an alternative approach that governs people without individuali-
zation, namely by using techniques tomodify their environment instead.What
appeals to Foucault in this alternative is undoubtedly the prospect of gov-
erning people without askingwho they are and thereby, it seems, giving peo-
ple autonomy over questions concerning their identity and agency—indeed,
as I have emphasized elsewhere, leaving more room for self-governing.30
Yet the distinction between interventions that are internal to subjectivity
and those that are external, as they modify the environment, threatens to
conceal the fact that in both cases a rationality of governing requires subjec-
tion [assujetissement] in order to operate. Becker’s insight is to turn his ac-
count of economic rationality into a theory of rational agency, which offers a
general framework for governing people as homo economicus. This frame-
work involves subjection without individualization. Attempts to govern
people on the basis of Becker’s account of homo economicus must assume
that it indeed captures the rationality of human action in the given domain.
Foucault, when he discusses Becker’s theory, is perfectly aware of this: “what
makes the individual governable [gouvernementalisable], what enables get-
ting a hold of the individual, it is to the extent, and only to the extent, that
the individual is homo economicus” (N, p. 258; my emphasis). And yet this
type of subjection is not individualizing precisely due to its purported gen-
erality. In Becker’s framework, my being a homo economicus cannot indi-
viduate me from others because the economic rationality is what we all
share. That is why Becker’s neoliberal governmental rationality does not
identify different kinds of individuals although its operation, too, relies on
a specific form of subjection.29. Foucault, “L’évolution de la notion d’’individu dangereux’ dans la psychiatrie légale du
XIXe siècle,” in Dits et écrits, 2:443–64.
30. See Tuomo Tiisala, “Overcoming ‘The Present Limits of the Necessary’: Foucault’s Con-
ception of a Critique,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 55, no. S1 (2017): 14–16.
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Even if my interpretation rectifies misunderstandings concerning Fou-
cault’s engagement with Becker’s ideas, there is another source that fuels
speculation about Foucault’s neoliberal allegiance. Foucault’s work mani-
fests almost complete silence on the topic of justice and, specifically, eco-
nomic equality. As these topics define the subject matter of political philos-
ophy for many, it is not completely unreasonable to interpret Foucault’s
silence as evidence of negligence that is analogous to the systematic exclu-
sion of these topics in the neoliberal governmental rationality. The fact that
the value guiding Foucault’s work is freedom, understood as a historically
situated and socially embedded capacity for autonomy, is likely to only re-
inforce this impression (see “Q”).31 Moreover, when Foucault briefly dis-
cusses justice, in a debate with NoamChomsky in 1971, he calls into question
the usefulness of the very concept.32Thus, it appears that Foucault’s focus on
freedom while remaining silent, even skeptical, about justice lines up with
the neoliberal elimination of normative questions that are not formulated
in terms of economic rationality. However, this interpretation is flawed for two
reasons. First, Foucault’s sustained focus on the relationship between power
and freedom does not preclude a concern for justice, including economic
equality, whereas these topics are conceptually eliminated from the neolib-
eral framework. In fact, as Ben Golder argues, Foucault’s political activism,
supported by a stream of small publications outside of academic channels, is
essential for grasping the tactical use of the concepts of justice and human
rights that he came to endorse, in which their justification is detached from
any notion of human nature.33 Second, it is crucial to appreciate that Fou-
cault’s focus on normalization and autonomy is motivated by a concern
for equal respect, an essential component of equality that was long eclipsed
by questions of distribution in Anglophone political philosophy. Following
Elizabeth Anderson’s corrective, however, we should acknowledge that equal-
ity always concerns relationships between people, as well as patterns of dis-
tribution.34 Similarly, Charles Mills reminds us that justice is not merely a
matter of distributing divisible goods, but it essentially concerns the rela-
tions of equal respect between individuals and groups, which are often dis-
torted by entrenched patterns of racist, sexist, and other forms of disre-
spect.35 Adopting the broader conception of equality that Anderson and31. See Tiisala, “Overcoming ‘The Present Limits of the Necessary.’ ”
32. See Foucault, “De la nature humaine: justice contre pouvoir,” in Dits et écrits, 1:1368–73.
33. See Ben Golder, Foucault and the Politics of Rights (Stanford, Calif., 2015).
34. See Elizabeth Anderson, “What Is the Point of Equality?” Ethics 109 (Jan. 1999): 287–337.
35. See Charles Mills, “Racial Equality,” in The Equal Society: Essays on Equality in Theory
and Practice, ed. George Hull (Lanham, Md., 2015), pp. 43–71.
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pret Foucault’s work. From this readjusted angle it is plain to see that
Foucault’s concern with the status of socially marginalized groups such as
mental health patients, prison inmates, and so-called sexual perverts, ad-
dresses fundamental problems of equality. Furthermore, Foucault’s charac-
teristic refusal to tell people what to think or what to do can be appreciated
as a commitment to give equal respect to the autonomy of individuals de-
spite their socially marginalized, even stigmatized, status.
Nevertheless, Foucault remains virtually silent on questions of distribu-
tive justice and economic equality. And I do believe that this fact has enabled
a strategic allegiance to develop posthumously between Foucault’s work and
the market fundamentalism of neoliberal governmental rationality. Before
explaining what I mean, it is important to note how my diagnosis differs
from the vague suggestion that Foucault may “have been seduced” by neo-
liberalism.36 The suggestion is motivated by Foucault’s sympathetic response
to Becker’s work in the 1979 lectures, but I have already explained why and
how Foucault’s reading of Becker should be interpreted against the back-
drop of the apparatus of normalization and specifically in the field of penal-
ity alone. And given Foucault’s vehement methodological rejection of a the-
ory of human nature, it seems unlikely, to put it mildly, that Becker’s theory
of homo economicus would have been an exception in this regard.37 In con-
trast, I will defend my alternative diagnosis by explaining a strategic link be-
tween Foucault’s work and the neoliberal governmental rationality without
attributing any neoliberal commitments to Foucault. What matters is not
what Foucault said about neoliberalism but his silence on economic equal-
ity. Due to that silence, I will argue, Foucault’s work has posthumously acquired
a role as an unwitting ally of neoliberalism that reinforces its systematic ex-
clusion of the topic of economic equality from political discourse and
imagination.
5. Topical Exclusion
During the neoliberal period between 1980 and 2020, wealth disparity in
the US fell back to its staggering 1920s levels, and middle-class wages began a
steady decline in real terms while the cost of health care and education sky-
rocketed. Concurrently with this unprecedented regression in economic equal-
ity, concerns of disadvantaged minority groups, organized under the um-
brella of identity politics, gradually replaced distributive justice and economic36. Zamora, “Foucault, the Left, and the 1980s,” p. 11.
37. See Foucault, “De la nature humaine: justice contre pouvoir,” in Dits et écrits, 2:1453.
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say, the struggles of historically oppressed groups for recognition as equals are
politically indispensable, and today, in the US of 2021, they are nowhere close
to a permanent victory. But the concurrent ascendance of identity politics and
the marginalization of economic equality as topics of political attention took
place in tandem, as though appreciating one required excluding the other.38
Meanwhile, in academic discourse, John Rawls, the preeminent political phi-
losopher of the era, came to reject his original project to develop a theory of
distributive justice as “unrealistic” and “impossible.”39 For Rawls, problems of
cooperation and stability in a democratic culture of reasonable pluralism re-
placed justice as the definitive topic of political philosophy. Although Rawls
never gave up a theory of justice in his work, its status shifted from the center
of political philosophy to the periphery, reflecting a decisive change in am-
bition and argumentative strategy. In Foucault’s work, there is no gradual
move away from questions of distributive justice, but its different orienta-
tion to begin with, specifically its focus on subjectivity, has come to enable
and reinforce the shift of attention away from economic equality during the
neoliberal era.
To identify this phenomenon, let me introduce the concept of topical
exclusion. Topical exclusion is a social mechanism that produces ignorance.
Importantly, however, it is distinct from the social mechanisms that pro-
duce ignorance in the form of false consciousness. Topical exclusion pro-
duces ignorance (about x) by directing attention (at y). A range of social
mechanisms can be at play in topical exclusion, and none of them need to
be intentionally implemented; but they all operate by means of directing at-
tention. In contrast, as the notion of false consciousness suggests, there may
be other mechanisms that produce ignorance by distorting the content of
what one believes, desires, and values. Epistemically or normatively defective
propositional attitudes constitute one way to be ignorant about economic in-
equality. But topical exclusion functions by directing epistemic and normative
attention, as it were, prior to the formation of content. One can also be igno-
rant about economic inequality simply by virtue of not having thought about
it at all. In principle, topical exclusion can be investigated in connection with
any topic, but its significance as an analytical tool for a political economy of
attention requires a topic of general interest, for example, economic inequal-
ity. Paying attention to economic inequality is in the interest of everyone38. For a study of how identity politics functions to divert attention from economic in-
equality in the US that is congenial to my argument, see Asad Haider, Mistaken Identity: Race
and Class in the Age of Trump (New York, 2018).
39. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York, 1993), pp. xvii, xxv. See also Rawls, “The
Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” University of Chicago Law Review 64 (Summer 1997): 807.
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pattern of distribution whose justification would not survive scrutiny.
As it happens, the topic of economic equality has become marginalized
concurrently with the shift of political attention to identity politics. I am
not suggesting that this development is congenial to Foucault’s work, but
it is nevertheless one of its unintended effects. In 1982, Foucault crystallized
his view of the politically pivotal role of subjectivity by saying that “there is
no other point of resistance to political power, from the beginning till the
end, than in the relation of the self to itself.”40 The personal was political
before neoliberalism, but during the neoliberal period there has been no ac-
ademic author whose work has come to consolidate a vision of politics
around subjectivity more than Foucault.41 The irony here is that Foucault’s
stature in queer culture as “a fucking saint,” to borrow David Halperin’s ac-
colade, is based on philosophical commitments that undermine support for
any mainstream notion of identity politics whose ultimate goal is recogni-
tion.42 As careful readers of Foucault know, the overarching ambition of
“a historical ontology of ourselves” is to question, destabilize, even destroy
who one is instead of solidifying the given identities in a pluralistic liberal
framework of reciprocal recognition (“Q,” p. 1393). On Foucault’s view, such
“history will be ‘effective’ to the extent that it makes our very being discon-
tinuous.”43 Nevertheless, it is the most lasting effect of Foucault’s work that
we find it commonplace today to think, however superficially or confusedly,
that identity constitutes the substance of political struggle and therefore also
the fundamental topic of political discourse and imagination. But focusing, if
not reducing politics to questions about subjectivity is awfully convenient to
those individuals and corporations who economically benefit from the neo-
liberal governmental rationality that is responsible for the remarkable regress
in economic equality since 1980. For them, Foucault’s focus on the political
stakes of subjectivity has proven an unlikely but nevertheless efficient ally.40. Foucault, L’Herméneutique du sujet: Cours au Collège de France 1981–1982 (Paris, 2001),
p. 241. See Foucault, “Political Spirituality as the Will for Alterity: An Intervierw with the
Nouvel Observateur,” Critical Inquiry 47 (Autumn 2020): 121–34. For the history of this recently
discovered interview, see Sabina Vaccarino Bremner, “Introduction to Michel Foucault’s ‘Politi-
cal Spirituality as the Will for Alterity,’ ” Critical Inquiry 47 (Autumn 2020): 115–20. While the
academic edition of the French original is in preparation, the Nouvel Observateur published the
interview in French online, behind a paywall, on 7 February 2018.
41. For an account of the reception of French theory in the US as the new radical theory
that marginalized Marxism and other approaches concerned with economic inequality, see
François Cusset, French Theory: How Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, & Co. Transformed the Intellec-
tual Life of the United States, trans. Jeff Fort (Minneapolis, 2008).
42. Halperin, Saint Foucault, p. 6.
43. Foucault, “Nietzsche, la généalogie, l’histoire,” in Dits et écrits, 1:1015. Foucault here elab-
orates on Nietzsche’s notion of effective history (wirkliche Historie).
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ferent ways in which the topic of economic justice has been excluded. The
neoliberal governmental rationality operates a conceptual erasure of the nor-
mative perspective that is needed for such questions to be formulated at all,
but no such conceptual reconfiguration can be found in Foucault’s work.
And, as I have argued, Foucault’s overarching project should be appreciated
as work that tackles fundamental problems of inequality, even though he
never explicitly put it that way. Moreover, it would be false to think that
Foucault’s analytic of power neglects the economic dimension of social re-
lations. But how exactly the economic dimension relates to relations of power
in Foucault’s analysis, including its continuities and disagreementswithMarx,
is a topic in its own right I must postpone to another occasion.6. Conclusion
I hope it is clear now that the relationship between Foucault’s work and
neoliberalism is more complex than has been appreciated on either side of
the controversy. I have tried to show that by doing two things. First, I argued
that Foucault’s sympathetic discussion of Becker’s ideas must be interpreted
against the backdrop of Foucault’s sustained concern with normalization,
which also limits his salutary response to Becker’s neoliberalism to the do-
main of penality. I then explained how Foucault’s focus on the political stakes
of subjectivity has posthumously come to function as an unwitting ally of neo-
liberal governmental rationality by reinforcing the topical exclusion of eco-
nomic equality. Althoughmy analysis here builds upon Foucault’s ownmeth-
odological ideas, it also involves an important divergence because topical
exclusion links a strategy of power to ignorance, not knowledge. Therefore,
it may seem that the concept of topical exclusion cannot be adopted into
the analytical framework Foucault developed for studying how power is exer-
cised. But Foucault’s analytic of power involves no commitment to some
mechanism of power being essential. When Foucault argues against the view
that techniques and effects of power are negative—that power restricts, for-
bids, represses, says “no”—his aim is not to deny the existence of such neg-
ative mechanisms but to make conceptual room for other, positive, tech-
niques of power. The target of Foucault’s criticism is the received view of
power as essentially restrictive, a “postulate” he rejects, as follows:
This postulate is that power, especially repressive power, would always
and essentially produce effects of miscognition [meconnaissance]. In
acting as a ban, in barring access to manifestation, the major effect of
repressive power would be to prevent the formation of knowledge:
to prevent it in the strongest sense, by producing the unconscious; or
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a whole series of effects on the order of denial of reality, ignorance,
blindness, or false consciousness.
In brief, the major effect of power would be not knowing, or at any
rate the impossibility of access to the truth. Power would be that which
bars access to the truth.44
Invoking this “postulate . . .which supposes that wherever there is power the
green grass of knowledge cannot grow,” Foucault asks “if it wouldn’t be pos-
sible to . . . say that power, with the discursive practices that bear it and pro-
nounce its effects, is the producer of knowledge.”45 But Foucault only re-
jects, and only needs to reject, the universal claim that power “always and
essentially” functions by preventing knowledge, so there is no reason to deny
that ignorance, too, could play a role in tactics and strategies through which
power is exercised.
Thus, where I deviate from Foucault, my analysis actually shows how to
expand his framework. It would be a nonstarter to ask whether relations of
power produce knowledge or ignorance. Any adequate approach must ac-
knowledge both options and identify mechanisms that underwrite explana-
tions of both types of case, respectively. Foucault’s argument against the re-
pressive hypothesis was needed to explain how the incitation to discourse
can be a mechanism of power and why speaking the truth need not set us
free.46 But a full picture requires that we supplement Foucault’s analyses of
power and knowledge with tools to explain how relations of power harness,
produce, and maintain ignorance. For instance, consider the mechanisms
of “white ignorance” that continue to provide strategic support, as Mills
argues, to the deeply entrenched power effects of European colonialism.47
Only Foucaultian dogma could limit the good “positivist” spirit of an analytic
of power, as Paul Veyne characterized Foucault’s insistence on the historical
particularity of his every object of study.48 Despite this “happy positivism,”
however, Foucault was Kantian enough to be the first to remind us that “it44. Foucault, “We Are Not Repressed,” in The Event (1975), vol. 1 of Schizo-Culture, ed.
Sylvère Lotringer and David Morris (Los Angeles, 2013), pp. 149–50; trans. mod., my emphasis.
The original French manuscript of this lecture which Foucault delivered in English has been
lost. Meconnaissance was translated as “misrecognition,” although Foucault’s claim clearly
concerns cognition, not recognition.
45. Ibid., p. 150; my emphasis.
46. See Foucault, La volonté de savoir, pp. 25–49.
47. See Charles Mills, “White Ignorance,” in Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance, ed. Shan-
non Sullivan and Nancy Tuana (Albany, N.Y., 2007), pp. 11–38.
48. Paul Veyne, “Foucault Revolutionizes History,” in Foucault and His Interlocutors, ed.
Davidson (Chicago, 1997), p. 147.
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diately light up,” but any inquiry, including the analysis of relations of power,
is shaped by its conceptual resources and theoretical outlook.49Accordingly, I
believe that the formidable challenge tomake sense of a strategic link between
Foucault’s work and neoliberal governmental rationality, without conflating
it with Foucault’s sympathetic engagement with Becker’s work in 1979, has
been largely due to a lack of adequate conceptual tools. In addition to disen-
tangling those two dimensions of Foucault’s relationship with neoliberalism,
my analysis illustrates why Foucault’s framework for studying relations of
power needs to be supplemented with the concept of topical exclusion. The
fruitfulness of that concept can be measured by the success of my attempt
to provide a more nuanced analysis of Foucault’s complex relationship with
neoliberalism.49. Foucault, L’archéologie du savoir, pp. 164, 61.
